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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
The evidence at the trial of Ismoila Idowu on the charge 
of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 
one kilogram of heroin, 21 U.S.C. S 846, made it crystal 
clear that Idowu was -- and knew that he was -- involved 
in an illicit transaction of some sort. There also is no 
question that the transaction that was the subject of the 
government's undercover investigation and surveillance, in 
which Idowu's co-defendant Monadu Ajao was the buyer, 
involved more than one kilogram of heroin. The sole 
question on Idowu's appeal, following his conviction by a 
jury, is whether there was sufficient evidence that Idowu 
knew that the subject matter of the transaction was a 
controlled substance, rather than some other form of 
contraband, such as stolen jewels or computer chips or 
currency, such proof being necessary to support Idowu's 
conviction.1 
 
We have consistently held in cases of this genre that, 
even in situations where the defendant knew that he was 
engaged in illicit activity, and knew that "some form of 
contraband" was involved in the scheme in which he was 
participating, the government is obliged to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge of the 
particular illegal objective contemplated by the conspiracy. 
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 405 (3d 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 
1988). We also have consistently held that, in the absence 
of such proof, a guilty verdict on a conspiracy charge 
cannot be sustained. See Thomas, 114 F.3d at 406; Wexler, 
838 F.2d at 91. We think that the evidence that Idowu 
knew that heroin or some other controlled substance was 




1. Idowu also challenged the admission of testimony regarding the money 
that was seized from him. Since we conclude that, even with the 
admission of this testimony, there was insufficient evidence to convict 
Idowu, we do not reach this argument. 
 




The events leading up to Idowu's March 24, 1997, arrest 
in Jersey City, New Jersey, began two months earlier in 
Lahore, Pakistan. At that time, the United States Drug 
Enforcement Agency (the "DEA") in Pakistan seized over two 
kilograms of heroin in the course of an undercover 
operation. The agency used the seized heroin as part of a 
sting operation that targeted prospective purchasers in the 
United States. Pakistani drug dealers, believing that their 
co-conspirators still possessed the heroin, were led to 
contact Abdul Khaliq, who actually was a DEA informant. 
During a telephone call organized by another DEA 
operative, a man who identified himself as "Raja" told 
Khaliq that someone would call him to arrange to purchase 
the heroin. 
 
Several weeks later, Monadu Ajao, who identified himself 
as Raja's friend, and who became Idowu's co-defendant, 
telephoned Khaliq. During the course of six telephone 
conversations, which were taped by Khaliq, Ajao negotiated 
to buy the heroin. Khaliq and Ajao ultimately agreed to 
meet at a Quality Inn parking lot in Jersey City, New Jersey 
on March 24, 1997. Throughout the telephone negotiations, 
Ajao never mentioned Idowu, nor did he specifically 
mention heroin. Ajao did indicate that he was acting on 
behalf of others, and at one point implied that another man 
was helping him to gather the money he was to pay to 
Khaliq. 
 
On March 24, DEA agents set up surveillance at the 
Quality Inn. They wired Khaliq with a concealed tape 
recorder and transmitter so that they could monitor the 
transaction from a nearby car. That afternoon, Ajao arrived 
at the Quality Inn in a black Lincoln Town Car driven by 
Idowu. Ajao and Idowu left the car and entered the hotel 
lobby, Idowu carrying a brown leather bag. The two men 
then exited the lobby, re-entered the sedan, and moved it to 
another location in the parking lot. Khaliq arrived in a Ford 
Explorer with a black suitcase in his trunk; the DEA had 
previously outfitted the suitcase to hold drugs in its lining.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This was the same suitcase that the DEA seized in Pakistan in its 
undercover operation there. 
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Ajao got out of the Town Car and introduced himself to 
Khaliq. Idowu remained in the vehicle. Ajao and Khaliq 
discussed the payment, which was to have been $30,000. 
Ajao told Khaliq that he only had brought $20,000. Idowu 
was unable to hear their conversation. Ajao and Khaliq 
then returned to the Town Car. Ajao encouraged Khaliq to 
get into the car, but Khaliq declined Ajao's offer. Ajao, 
sitting in the front seat of the Town Car, continued to talk 
to Khaliq, who remained standing outside. Ajao and Idowu 
then exited the vehicle, at which point Khaliq met Idowu for 
the first time. When Khaliq asked who Idowu was, Ajao 
replied that "he is driver." 
 
All three gathered near the trunk of the Town Car. Idowu 
opened the trunk, which contained the brown leather bag; 
he then opened the bag, displaying the money inside to 
Khaliq. As Khaliq counted the money, Khaliq stated that he 
would have to take the bag with him. Idowu had some 
documents in the bag, and Khaliq told Idowu, who wanted 
to get the bag back, that Idowu could "pull [the documents] 
out" and that he would return the bag to Idowu the next 
day. Idowu told Khaliq that he had checked the money 
himself, and that all $20,000 was there. 
 
Khaliq took the bag of money to the Ford and opened the 
rear hatch. Idowu, who previously had pulled the Town Car 
into a spot next to the Ford, then removed the specially- 
outfitted black suitcase from Khaliq's car and placed it into 
the still-open trunk of the Town Car. Idowu unzipped the 
black suitcase and, on seeing nothing inside, told Ajao, 
"They didn't pack this thing." Ajao told Idowu to press the 
suitcase with his hands. Khaliq tried to reassure Ajao and 
Idowu by explaining that something was concealed in the 
frame of the suitcase. Moments later, the DEA arrested 
Ajao and Idowu. 
 
The DEA agents recovered $3,000 in cash from Idowu's 
right front pocket, $495 from his back pocket, and $18,000 




As both Idowu and the government correctly point out, 
we "must determine whether, viewing the evidence most 
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favorably to the government, there is substantial evidence 
to support the jury's guilty verdict." Wexler, 838 F.2d at 90 
(citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)). 
"The elements of a conspiracy may be proven entirely by 
circumstantial evidence, but each element of the offense 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 838 F.2d at 
90 (citations omitted). One element the government must 
show in a conspiracy case is that "the alleged conspirators 
shared a `unity of purpose', the intent to achieve a common 
goal, and an agreement to work together toward the goal." 
Id. at 90-91. In order for us to sustain a defendant's 
conviction for conspiracy, the government must have put 
forth evidence "tending to prove that defendant entered into 
an agreement and knew that the agreement had the specific 
unlawful purpose charged in the indictment." Id. at 91. See 
also United States v. Scanzello, 832 F.2d 18, 20 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
 
Idowu acknowledges that the evidence tends to show that 
he reached some kind of agreement with Ajao and that he 
knew that he was involved in some form of illicit activity. 
Nevertheless, he contends that the evidence offered at trial 
is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
knew that the purpose of the illicit transaction was to 
obtain possession of a controlled substance. 
 
The government points to a series of acts by Idowu that, 
in its opinion, prove that Idowu knew he was part of a drug 
deal. First, Idowu carried the brown leather bag containing 
the money. Second, Idowu apparently owned the bag, as 
evidenced by the fact that he kept personal documents in 
the bag. Third, Ajao was willing to leave Idowu alone with 
the money. Fourth, Ajao believed that it was safe to talk to 
Khaliq in the presence of Idowu. Fifth, Idowu was the one 
who showed Khaliq the money and who told Khaliq that he 
had checked it to ensure that it was all there. Sixth, Idowu 
opened the black suitcase to check the contents without 
being prompted by Ajao. Seventh, the two defendants spoke 
Yoruban (a Nigerian dialect) together. Eighth, Ajao urged 
Idowu to feel around in the suitcase. Ninth, Idowu had 
$3,000 in his pocket at the time he was arrested, which he 
presumably had skimmed from the stash. 
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From these facts, the government attempts to draw a 
number of inferences about Idowu's behavior. However, 
only two inferences are proper: that Idowu had some kind 
of preexisting relationship with Ajao, and that Idowu knew 
he was participating in some sort of illegal transaction. But 
the evidence does not support the critical inference on 
which the government's case depends -- that Idowu knew 
the transaction was a drug transaction. Neither Ajao nor 
Khaliq referred to the subject of their deal as "heroin" or 
"drugs" in Idowu's presence on the day of the transaction, 
or in their recorded phone conversations. Instead, they 
referred to the subject matter of the deal as "the stuff," 
which can describe a variety of contraband. Nor did Idowu 
take part in any of the recorded conversations with Khaliq 
that preceded the March 24 transaction. While Idowu may 
have known that the object of the sale was small enough to 
be placed in a suitcase, a wide variety of contraband items 
can fit into a container of that size, including stolen jewelry, 
laundered money, stolen computer chips, and 
counterfeiting plates. At no time did Idowu give any 
indication that he knew what Ajao was purchasing with the 
money. 
 
The government's strongest argument is that Ajao's 
invitation to Khaliq to get into the car, in which Idowu was 
sitting, reflects such total confidence in Idowu that an 
inference can be drawn that Idowu knew the full nature of 
the transaction. "Inferences from established facts are 
accepted methods of proof when no direct evidence is 
available so long as there exists a logical and convincing 
connection between the facts established and the 
conclusion inferred." United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 
1153, 1159 (3d Cir. 1989). However, the government's 
argument actually relies on two interdependent inferences, 
at least one of which lacks a convincing connection between 
the facts and the conclusion. 
 
The first inference is that, by inviting Khaliq into the car 
to talk, Ajao was willing to speak freely in front of Idowu. 
While we can only speculate what they might have talked 
about in the car, we think there are a number of more 
viable explanations for Ajao's invitation to Khaliq. It might 
have been merely a friendly, confidence-inspiring gesture. 
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Moreover, the record suggests that Ajao was apprehensive 
that he was under surveillance, so he may have invited 
Khaliq into the car because he wanted to drive somewhere 
else to complete the deal. But even if we accept that a 
reasonable jury could infer that Ajao felt comfortable 
speaking in front of Idowu, the second inference-- that 
because Ajao was willing to speak about the transaction in 
the presence of Idowu, Idowu must already have been 
aware of the deal's subject matter -- is entirely without 
support in the record, regardless of how favorably to the 
government the evidence is viewed.3 Because the 
government has presented no evidence that would justify 
the jury's inferential leap between the second inference and 
the conclusion, and because we do not think the first 
assumption alone, without the support of the necessary 
second assumption, is a strong enough foundation on 
which to ground the conviction, we cannot hold that the 
government has presented evidence sufficient for the jury to 
find that the government proved Idowu's knowledge beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
 
Our case law supports the conclusion that it was 
unreasonable for the jury to infer that Idowu knew of the 
transaction's ultimate purpose. In United States v. Thomas, 
114 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1997), a drug courier named Lynch, 
after being arrested, agreed to cooperate with the DEA by 
following through on a plan to drop off a suitcase in a motel 
room. Defendant Thomas, acting on a communication from 
someone named "Cliff," picked up the room key and entered 
the room that contained the suitcase, in accordance with 
the arrangements Lynch had made with her co-conspirator, 
Petersen. Thomas then left the room without the suitcase 
and without drugs. Upon being arrested, Thomas explained 
that he had been offered $500 to check on the luggage. See 
id. at 404-05. 
 
Much like Idowu, Thomas conceded that there was 
"evidence tending to show that he entered into some kind 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note in passing that it is not uncommon for managers of 
clandestine illegal operations to keep their employees insulated from one 
another and from the overall plan of operation so that they cannot 
supply evidence against others involved. 
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of agreement," but he contended "that the evidence 
presented at trial [was] insufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . that he knew that the purpose of the 
agreement was the specific unlawful purpose charged in the 
indictment, i.e., the possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute." 114 F.3d at 405. We agreed with 
Thomas, noting that the government failed to prove the 
substance of the phone calls made from "Cliff " to Thomas 
and that it failed to offer evidence that Thomas ever spoke 
to Lynch or Petersen at all. Finally, we pointed out that the 
government's evidence failed to controvert Thomas's 
proffered explanation for his actions, which was that he 
had received a phone call from Cliff asking him simply to go 
into the hotel room and to leave the door unlocked on the 
way out. We concluded that "there is no evidence from 
which a jury could permissibly infer that Thomas knew that 
the object of the conspiracy was to possess cocaine," and 
therefore that "the evidence cannot support Thomas' 
conspiracy conviction." Id. at 406. 
 
Like the prosecution in Thomas, the government here has 
failed to prove that the defendant ever heard specific 
reference to the subject matter of the transaction in which 
he was involved. The government would have us distinguish 
Thomas on the ground that Thomas had presented a 
credible alternative explanation for his acts, where Idowu 
did not offer an alternative explanation for his participation. 
However, in refusing to uphold Thomas's conviction, we 
relied not on the presence of a convincing alternative 
explanation by the defendant but on the total absence of 
evidence showing that Thomas knew that cocaine was 
involved. Thomas, 114 F.3d at 406. Therefore, the 
credibility of Idowu's explanation of his role in the 
transaction is not a factor, and cannot make up for the lack 
of specific evidence of Idowu's knowledge of the 
transaction's subject matter. 
 
United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1988), 
further supports our conclusion. In Wexler, the court noted 
that there was "ample circumstantial evidence . .. from 
which the jury could have concluded that Wexler was 
involved in a conspiracy" to transport some kind of 
contraband in a Ryder truck. 838 F.2d at 91. Such 
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evidence included the fact that Wexler drove the car in a 
manner that suggested he was a lookout for the truck, that 
Wexler had a fraudulently-obtained CB radio in his car 
when he was arrested, that he made a gesture that 
appeared to signal one of the conspirators, and that he 
spoke with another conspirator several times during the 
operation. Id. However, we concluded, "What is missing is 
any evidence that Wexler knew that a controlled substance 
was couched behind the doors of the Ryder truck." Id. 
Because "[t]hat knowledge is an essential element of the 
conspiracy charged," and because "keeping bad company" 
is not sufficient grounds on which to convict a defendant 
for conspiracy, the conviction was overturned. Id. 
 
The government tries to distinguish the facts in Wexler 
from the facts in the present case. It argues that unlike 
Wexler, who appeared to be on the outside edge of the 
conspiracy, Idowu was a "trusted member" of the 
conspiracy. In support of this argument, the government 
points to the fact that Idowu was entrusted with a large 
amount of cash, that he possessed the keys to his own car 
trunk (where the cash was kept), that he knew $20,000 was 
the correct amount of money, that he assured Khaliq that 
it was all there, and that, upon finding nothing in the black 
suitcase, he reacted as if he had expected to inspect the 
contents. Taking all these points as true, the government -- 
as in Wexler -- still has failed to show that Idowu knew 
what the deal was about. The fact patterns both in Wexler 
and in the case at bar are consistent with transactions that 
do not involve drugs of any sort. And because the 
government failed to provide evidence that Idowu knew that 
drugs were in fact the subject matter of the transaction, the 
jury could not draw a permissible inference that Idowu had 
knowledge of the nature of the deal.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. While not the basis for our decision, we note that there is evidence 
that makes it quite possible that Idowu was someone quite different from 
the "trusted confederate" the government would make him out to be. It 
appears that Idowu had skimmed at least some of the $3,000 found in 
his pocket from the stash of money in the brown leather bag. The bag 
was supposed to have held $20,000, but instead held only $18,000. If 
Idowu did skim money from the bag, this suggests that far from being a 
co-conspirator playing an integral role in the exchange, Idowu was a 
 




In light of our case law and of the specific facts in this 
case, we conclude that there was an absence of evidence 
that Idowu knew the subject matter of the transaction was 
the purchase of more than one kilogram of heroin. We 
therefore hold that no reasonable jury could have 
concluded that the government had met its burden of proof, 
which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 




dishonest driver with his own agenda. If the government's theory is 
correct, Idowu was about to become the partial owner of $165,000 worth 
of heroin. The fact that Idowu may have felt it worth the risk to skim a 
petty $3,000 suggests that Idowu was not involved in the heart of the 
transaction and that the government is therefore incorrect. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The court's majority opinion provides a fair account of 
the evidence. Unlike my colleagues, I conclude that this 
evidence supports the verdict against Mr. Idowu. 
 
The evidence indisputably supports the proposition that 
Ajao intended to purchase a large quantity of heroin from 
Khaliq in the parking lot of the Quality Inn. The evidence 
also indisputably supports the proposition that Idowu 
committed himself to facilitate the anticipated parking lot 
transaction. He drove Ajao to the site with the cash, he 
transported the cash in his own suitcase, he represented to 
the seller that he had counted the cash himself and it was 
sufficient to cover the purchase price, and he attempted to 
confirm that the merchandise being purchased was in 
Khaliq's black suitcase. Finally, as the court acknowledges, 
the evidence indisputably supports the proposition that 
Idowu must have known that the transaction he committed 
to facilitate was an illicit one. The only reasonable doubt to 
which the court can point is the possibility that Idowu 
committed himself to facilitate a $20,000 illicit transaction 
either without knowing the unlawful objective to be 
achieved or having been misled about that objective. 
 
Given the inherent risk, it is an extremely rare 
occurrence when a person commits himself to facilitating a 
large illicit transaction without ascertaining the objective to 
be achieved. Moreover, the evidence with respect to Idowu's 
circumstances establishes that he was a trusted confidant 
of Ajao. Ajao was comfortable negotiating the transaction in 
Idowu's presence as well as with Idowu's having sole 
custody of the cash in Ajao's absence. This makes it even 
more unlikely that Idowu and Ajao failed to discuss why 
they were going to the Quality Inn parking lot or that Ajao 
misled Idowu into believing they were paying $20,000 for 
explosives, diamonds or computer chips. Finally, the 
evidence establishes that Idowu was at least tacitly 
assigned the task of checking Khaliq's black bag to confirm 
that Ajao was getting what was being paid for, an 
assignment Idowu would not have received if he were 
unaware of what he was looking for. Based on this common 
sense approach to the evidence, I conclude that the jury 
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properly could conclude that Idowu was guilty as charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
I would affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 
A True Copy: 
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